Introduction
The present economic crisis, as all crises, gives way to questions about the future economic order The present paper attempts to answer those questions on the grounds of available information on patentable innovation and aggregate accounts in thirteen countries -Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK, USA, India, China and Brasil -as well as information about innovative effort and financial performance of 6 global corporations: Ford Motor, General Motors, Honda, Chevron, Akzo Nobel and IBM.
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The macroeconomic context
Scientific input to real economy
Technological progress consists both in creating scientific inventions and in using them as input for creation of wealth in the real economy. Therefore the first important issue is how to measure the or it is not profitable to patent them, For example in oil & gas drilling business, where most innovations are so strongly site -specific that the probability of imitation is negligible but, on the other hand, the fact of publishing the description of those innovations could bring, for a firm, the risk of uncovering too many cards to the competitors. In the same way there are strong differences among countries as for the quality of their local intellectual property protection regimes. Scientific input appears at different peers of the value chain of the economy, however on the long run most scientific input to industry ends up as modifications or creation of final goods in the consumer markets. In these markets global marketing success strongly depends on patenting. On the other hand patenting is essential to global technology diffusion and spillover. At first sight patents seem to be a barrier to technology spillover as it assumes legal protection of inventions. However, on the long run patenting plays the same role as any legally regulated procedure -it is a way of communicating and solving complex problems in broad social systems. As a matter of fact, an invention is more likely to spillover when patented -all the actors of the process are in a clear situation then, with equally clear transaction costs and opportunities for economic rent. Nonpatented inventions, on the contrary, are much harder to diffuse as there is very few legal ways to do it. Thus research and development activity that ends up in a patent procedure can be considered as a complete process of technological development, with maximum value added, compared to those R&D projects which remain outside the patenting regime. Therefore patentable ( and patented )
innovation is essential to economic development and in this paper the number of patent applications filled by applicants domestic to the given country is considered as the aggregate measure of scientific input to the real economy of this country.
Currently the bulk of the global innovative effort, measured with the number of patent applications, seems to take place in 5 countries: USA, Japan and China as leaders, with France and United Kingdom as immediate followers ( see Table 1 ). Among those five, Japan alone represents about one half of the world's scientific input. Japan and United States account for more than 80% of it.
Therefore the first fact important for the present study is that the global scientific input is actually not as global as it could seem ( Germany is not included in the table due to the fact that it's unification in the post communist period makes comparisons difficult. At present the German economy represents some 60 000 domestic patent applications per year.). Furthermore, among those five four are developed countries, with one challenger -China -coming along at pace that has been particularly accelerated during the last two decades. Surprisingly enough India and Brasil, usually mentioned with China as other dominant emerging markets, come with less than one tenth each of the number of domestic patent applications. Among the thirteen countries subject to the present analysis only five -Canada, Finland, Japan, USA and China -have significantly increased their scientific input whilst other developed countries -Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and United Kingdom -have witnessed an important downsizing of their innovative activity. The size of the scientific input to economy is significantly influenced by the ability of the labour force to produce innovation. Some authors tend to state that the overall equilibrium between the research and development activity and real production is determined by the percentage of the labour force able to produce innovation (Eaton, Kortum 1999) . The volume of scientific input is one thing, the relative ability to do so is another. If we consider the average annual number of domestic patent applications per 1000 people employed (Table 2 ) , a significant disparity among the developed countries appears, similar to that occurring for the size of scientific input. The size of scientific input to real economy in the given country seems to depend strongly upon the relative division of labour between the R&D sector on one hand and the sector of production on the other hand, just as stated by the "golden rule of research" by Edmund S. Phelps ( 1964) . There, two different paths of economic development seem to appear. The first one, represented by Finland, Japan, USA and China, may be called "R&D oriented". On the long run these countries display a constant growth both of scientific input and of the relative propensity of the workforce to perform it. Others, like
United Kingdom, France, Sweden, India or Brasil, are definitely not oriented in that way. Their scientific input and the relative ability of the workforce to innovate are declining or staying quite even over the last six decades. 
The real output from the scientific input
At the macroeconomic level innovation is supposed to bring two basic kinds of real returns: a) higher productivity b) higher product. The first kind relies on the assumption that scientific input leads to more efficient technologies and those, in turn, bring a more efficient usage of labour ( see for example: Romer 1986; Grossman, Helpman 1993). The second relates the fact that successful innovation leads to creation of new product markets ( Schumpeter 1976) and to investment in new plant and equipment ( Phelps 1964; Tobin 1961 Tobin , 1969 Tobin , 1971 , and, consequently to a greater output from the given outlays of production factors, as well as to a greater value added by the whole economy. The Table 3 shows average labour productivity, per hour worked, for 11 out of the set of 13 countries that were taken into account for the computation of scientific input: Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK, USA, India, China, Brasil . In all eleven countries productivity displays a steady growth on the long run, whilst, as it was previously pointed out, the productivity of the same economies in terms of scientific input tends rather to lower, with rare exceptions. There seem to be a country -specific pattern as for both the production of scientific input to real economy and the subsequent real output from it, and, in the same time, in all the thirteen countries studied both patenting and further economic usage of scientific inventions relies mainly on the business sector ( maybe with a slight exception of France, which has a very strong public research sector, though intrinsically linked with big corporations like Dassault or Elf). Therefore it is worth studying to what extent and in what ways the differences among countries can be explained by microeconomic factors, namely by individual strategies of business firms. In this respect a model is introduced further below and comparative case studies are conducted on the grounds of it.
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The microeconomic inquiry
Theoretical background
Firms tend to innovate when they earn some kind of innovation premium due to market novelty or to the increase of productivity ( Arrow 1962 
The model
Any market may be represented as a Selten's extensive game (1975), subgames of which are played as Harsanyi's games with imperfect information (1953; 1966; 1967; 1968) , by a temporarily finite and changing set of players. In each of those subgames each player (i) applies at the moment t a strategy S(i;t) as shown in Equation 1.
Equation 1 S i ; t =[ MAi ; t ; R i ; t]
-where S(i;t) is the strategy applied by the player i at the moment t, MA(i;t) is the set of modalities of action and R(i;t) is the set of results.
Strategies S(i;t) are real Nash's strategies in the sense that they aim at maximizing a complex set of pure, unicriterial strategies. The managers of a firm might undertake to maximize: a) scale of activity b) profitability c) short -term accumulation of capital d) long -term value for shareholders and by the same means the long -term ability of a firm to accumulate capital. Of course, it is arguable whether short -term accumulation of capital is a result or a means to achieve further results. For the purpose of the present model it is assumed that any accumulation of capital, even on the short -run, is reflected by investment cash -flow and financial cash -flow. As any cash -flow creates opportunities for appropriation of economic rent from the corresponding transactions it is further assumed that short -term accumulation of capital belongs to the set of results. Maximisation of those unicriterial strategies may be achieved through two basic modalities of action. The first one is investment in specific assets in the form of technologies, which, in turn is the embodied scientific input. The second is investment in non -specific financial assets, ex. in sovereign bonds.
Therefore the set of results R(i;t) is a real combination of pure results as shown in Equation 2 and the set of modalities of action MA(i;t) is real combination of pure modalities as shown in Equation 3
.
Equation 2
Ri is the investment j of the player i at the time t in non -specific financial assets; Modalities of action are twofold in kind but multiple in practical application: a firm can lead many investment projects in the same time in each of the two categories. In fact, most big firms do just so, never relying on one project; More tech j (i;t) projects are conducted in a sector, bigger is the probability for the product markets to reach a state of nearly optimal Dixit -Stiglitz product diversity ( Spence 1976; Dixit -Stiglitz 1977) , and, consequently, for the set of results R(i;t) to bring poorer scores on two kinds of results:
the scale of activity AS(i;t) and the profitability PR(i;t). The optimal Dixit -Stiglitz product diversity is likely to appear mainly in consumer markets for final goods and once there, its effects will transmit upstream of the value chain to markets of intermediate and then primary goods.
Therefore, on the aggregate scale, more intense is innovative activity in the business sector, more likely is this economy to yield negative marginal value added on innovation. This may but not necessarily has to lead further to poorer capital accumulation, both short -term and long term; if investments of fa j (i;t) kind bring satisfactory return on capital, they can compensate unsatisfactory return on tech j (i;t) projects and the business sector can continue on accumulating capital. Moreover, both in developed economies and in the quickly developing ones the growth of financial markets can yield such a high rate of return on investments of fa j (i;t) kind, that accumulation of capital and the resulting economic growth are not affected by the negative marginal value added on innovation.
A common reference level R*(t) may be defined at the moment t for the aggregate results R(i;t) of every given player i. R*(t) may be an external benchmark as well as an internal average or quantile.
All strategies S(i;t) that bear results R(i;t) lower than the reference level R*(t) are inefficient and unsatisfactory for players. On the other hand strategies S(i;t) with results R(i;t) > R*(t) are efficient and satisfactory. The state of the market at any given moment t may be represented as the state of the set MP of market participants. This set is fundamentally divided into two subsets: i) the subset {R(i;t) > R*(t)} of those market participants, whose strategies are efficient and bring satisfactory results ii) the subset {R(i;t) < R*(t)} of those market participants, whose strategies are inefficient and bring unsatisfactory results. Market participants that belong to {R(i;t) > R*(t)} are motivated to carry on the current game in the sense of Harsanyi's theory and they do so, whilst those belonging to {R(i;t) < R*(t)} have interest to change the rules of the game and to pass to another game, and they correspondingly modify their modalities of action. Consequently, market participants that belong to the subset {R(i;t) > R*(t)} tend to keep their modalities of actions unchanged and those modalities tend to shape a relatively stable n -tuple space of the game in the sense of Nash's theory as well as tend to a Nash's dynamic equilibrium. On the other hand, market participants from {R(i;t) < R*(t)} do not participate in forming a dynamic Nash's equilibrium. The dynamics of the market depend on mutual proportions between the two subsets {R(i;t) < R*(t)} and {R(i;t) > R*(t)}. If the subset {R(i;t) < R*(t)} prevails on {R(i;t) > R*(t)} in terms of number of participants or their relative impact on the market, the market as a whole tends towards structural change, meaning a Harsanyi's change of the rules and, consequently, a passage to another Selten's subgame.
Contrarily, should the subset {R(i;t) > R*(t)} in prevail on {R(i;t) < R*(t)}, the market tends to temporary homeostasis, with temporary Nash's equilibrium, without significant structural change.
Should a significant number of players be adversely affected, in the payback on their tech j (i;t)
projects, by the nearly optimal Dixit -Stiglitz product diversity, the response of the whole market in terms of structural change can be twofold. 
The case studies
The case studies introduced in this paper aim at demonstrating how the model is explanative to the link between innovative effort undertaken by business firms, the economic outcome of this effort Diversity of the companies subject to the present study is partly demonstrable on the grounds of observation of their pre -patenting innovative activity, measured with the ratio of non -capitalized R&D expenses to revenues ( Table 5 ). Accounting for this variable, the most important observation is the difference between Chevron, spending hardly more than 0,2% of its revenues and the other five, with spending comprised usually in an interval between 3 and 7% of their revenues. Then one can notice that Akzo -Nobel and IBM seem to spend more on R&D than the three automotive companies, whilst among the latter ones Honda seems to spend more than Ford and GM. SOURCE: ANNUAL REPORTS.
The R&D effort seems to be both firm and industry specific. As for patent applications, which are supposed to be at least a part of the outcome of the R&D expenditures, the situation is slightly more complicated ( Table 6 ). The biggest patenting activity had been taking place at Honda, with 5470 patent applications filled during the period of 2001 -2008. In a general manner, in the automotive sector is very active in patenting: during the period of study the three automotive firms filled 7467 patent applications in total whilst for the other three companies the same total was of 1472. Once again, Chevron seems to be a separate case, with an exceptionally strong cyclical variation. A strong firm -specificity is to notice as for the transformation of R&D outlays into patentable innovation. This transformation, possible to measure through a ratio of R&D expenditures per 1 patent application filled, is shown in the Table 7 . Important cross sectional and temporal differences are to notice. Honda is the cheapest inventor with an average of 6,42 USD mln of R&D outlays per 1 patent application filled, with Chevron immediately following at an average rate of 9,73 USD mln per 1 patent application, other firms as distant followers and General Motors closing the comparison with 129,38 USD mln per 1 patent application on average. In a general manner, productivity of R&D outlays in term of patentable innovation is more differentiated among the three automotive companies -Ford, GM and Honda -than among the whole sample of six firms. This could indicate, though not in a conclusive way yet, that the productivity of R&D outlays is strongly connected to a more broadly understood comparative advantage, thus to the relative performance of business strategies. Source: author's Innovative effort is supposed to end up in investment in specific assets, which, in turn, should lead to: a) some kind of temporary competitive advantage giving a result at the level of sales b) a change in profitability or the keep -up of profitability at a certain level c) a certain ability to attract investors and debt holders. As for investment, net of depreciation, every firm is a specific case, without any obvious industry -specific differences ( Table 8 The proportions between the R&D effort, the outcome of this effort in terms of the number of patent application and net investment seem to be very firm specific. This specificity is further to notice as it comes to analyze the growth of revenues since 2001 till 2008. The assumption behind this study is that patentable innovation coming in significant quantity is likely, under the condition of a sound strategy, to bring a growth of revenues. Table 9 respectively. Table 10 , which introduces IBM as the most profitable, with an average net profit ratio of 9,1% over the years 2001 -2008 . Then come Chevron, Akzo Nobel, Honda, Ford and GM, with respective averages of 6,6%, 6,1%, 5,2%, -2,6% and -5,8%. Source: Annual reports
The Table 11 shows annual absolute change of the book value of assets, which means the arithmetical difference between the book value of assets at the end of the year n1 minus the book value of assets at the end of the year n0, for the six companies studied, It is an approximation of short -term capital accumulation processes. Chevron and Honda accumulate, on the short -run, much more than the other four. Ford, GM and IBM display negative average annual accumulation.
If the theoretical, Schumpeterian assumption that scientific input generates accumulation of capital, it is worth to study the average change of the book value of assets per patent application, for each firm. From this point of view Chevron is the absolute leader with a long -term average of 163,88 million of USD per patent application. Then a long gap is to notice, after which Ford, Honda and IBM follow, with 14,67 million, 12,47 million and 12,46 million respectively, General Motors displaying a negative ratio of -2,44. As for long -term ability to accumulate capital, Tobin's q ratio had been computed, at the year's end, for each firm and each of the years studied ( Table 12 ). On average IBM ( average q = 2,2 ) and Honda ( average q = 2,06) are the leaders, with the other four keeping an average above q = 1,00. technologies. The second of the two -Chevron -translates a relatively small R&D effort into a moderate scientific result in terms of patent applications and all that is transformed into big net investment in specific assets as well as into important accumulation of capital. Honda and Chevron present four common traits. Firstly, they both tend to come at the stage of patentable invention at a fairly low cost in terms of non -capitalized R&D outlays. Secondly, they both seem to be able to boost their scale of activity on the grounds of their innovative effort. Thirdly, they both operate at a satisfactory, though not astounding, level of net profitability, around 5 -6%. Finally, both display a relatively high value of average Tobin's q, thus a good ability to accumulate capital on the long run.
The difference between them is the size, both absolute and relative to revenues, of their R&D effort, as well as the absolute size of their scientific input to production, in terms of patent applications.
General Motors and IBM are to find the other extremity of the scale as far as the average cost of one patent application, in terms of non -capitalized R&D outlays, is considered. The productivity of R&D activity, in terms of the average amount of R&D expenses needed to bring up one patentable invention, seems to be the key variable shaping the rationale of firms' strategies.
Honda and Chevron are efficient transformers of innovative effort operating in different business environments. Honda is under a strong external pressure to innovate, whilst Chevron can afford more endogenously driven innovation. On the other hand, both firms tend to consider the early stages of innovative activity as highly autonomous from the production business and they both manage innovation so as to conduct those early stages of innovation in separate organizations, with eventual arrangement of practical applications. Conclusion: regardless the magnitude and the main driving force of innovative effort in a firm, there seems to be a strong and positive interdependence between the efficiency of R&D effort in conducting innovative projects up the stage of practical patenting, and, on the other hand, the efficiency of the firm in accumulating capital, investing in specific assets and boosting sales. Firms that display that kind of business pattern, are sustainable both in their current operational activity and in their long -run interactions with capital markets.
The other four cases indicate that if the R&D activity of a firm seems inefficient in terms of R&D outlays per one patent application, it could mean two things. Firstly, the apparent inefficiency of innovative activity may mean real efficiency problems of the whole business, as in the case of General Motors. Secondly, the inefficiency of R&D could be just a mistaking appearance, for example due to the fact that technological race goes on so fast that there is not enough time for patenting every valuable outcome of R&D activity.
The core question of the case studies was: why do most of the worlds innovative effort and scientific input takes place in markets which are apparently hostile to innovation, as judged by marginal GDP per patent application ? The simplest possible answer is that firms do innovation either because they have to or because this is their comparative advantage and they can do it in an exceptionally efficient way. The two are linked, by the way. A comparative advantage in the field of R&D is likely to appear when an external pressure is felt. Exogenous pressure on innovation is strongly rooted in local product markets and their institutions, and thus long -lasting, just as the comparative advantage in R&D. Economies develop as firms develop. Economic growth is grounded in efficient business patterns. In some countries those business patterns shape themselves in an environment which hems them in with a lot of stimuli to develop innovative activity. This leads to the development of an economy which, regardless its pace of economic growth and balance of payments, comes to a point when marginal value added on innovation is negative. At this point, however, incentives to innovate do not disappear and firms continue to apply the same business patterns and thus do create scientific input which gives back negative marginal real output.
Conclusions
In 
